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ABSTRACT 
 
What explains the difference between the county level vote received by President Donald 
Trump and U.S. Senator Marco Rubio in the 2016 Florida general election? Over the last couple 
of decades, Florida has earned a reputation for being a highly competitive state that impacts 
control of the White House and congress. As Florida’s electorate becomes increasingly diverse, 
will the Democratic Party begin to win more often as their usual base grows, or will the 
Republican Party figure out a way to remain competitive? The 2016 general election presents an 
opportunity to analyze the structure of support for two Republican candidates who represent 
different paths for the future of the Republican Party: Trump, who won Florida by just one 
percent, and seemingly alienated Hispanics and women with his comments and policy proposals; 
or Rubio, who won by about eight percent, a Cuban-American thought to be a fresh voice for the 
GOP and a bridge to Hispanic voters. Regression analysis is used to examine support for Trump 
and Rubio and also the difference in support between the candidates. The results indicate Trump 
did better in counties with larger percentages of lower educated whites, lower income 
households, and higher unemployment rate. Rubio performed better than Trump in counties with 
larger numbers of Cuban and non-Cuban Hispanics, women, and voters not registered with either 
major party. These results suggest that Democrats may gain ground in Florida over time if the 
Trump wing of the GOP takes over the party and if current population trends continue. 
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2016 GENERAL ELECTION IN FLORIDA: INTRODUCTION AND 
BACKGROUND 
Introduction 
In 2016 Floridians voted for Republican President Donald Trump and for Republican 
Senator Marco Rubio. However, while Trump eked out a victory over Hillary Clinton by about 1 
percent (49 to 47.8), Rubio won by a more comfortable margin of almost 8 percent over Patrick 
Murphy (52 to 44.3). What explains these victories and, even more importantly, what explains 
the difference in their margin of victory? These are important questions given that many political 
analysts and researchers did not expect Trump to win nationwide or in the Sunshine State. Trump 
took an unorthodox path to victory in terms of campaign strategy, rhetoric, and issues that 
seemed to alienate some groups (immigrants, minorities and women) while seeking to mobilize 
others (working class whites, those strongly opposed to illegal immigration, and people fed up 
with establishment politics and economics – “the Swamp”). Meanwhile, Rubio engaged in a 
more orthodox campaign that sought to broaden the appeal of the traditional conservative 
establishment Republican brand to groups outside the usual base: Hispanics, immigrants, and 
women among others. Analyzing the 2016 Florida results can provide information on the impact 
of these strategies and about future political parties and candidates as they seek to position 
themselves with a changing electorate and win upcoming elections in Florida and nationwide. 
Florida is the quintessential battleground state. The state is frequently seen as crucial by 
campaign strategists, and its reputation as a kingmaker might stem from the historical fact that 
since the 1964 election, only one candidate managed to win the presidency despite losing in 
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Florida (Bishin and Klofstad 2009, 571). In addition, the state's population growth has made it 
more influential over the years, as it has gained more force in the Electoral College (MacManus 
and Penberthy 2004, 1). The state's population is an accurate representation of the country's 
overall racial and ethnic composition, which not only makes it easy for campaign strategists to 
test messages, but it makes elections competitive (MacManus and Penberthy 2004,1). Some 
authors suggest that in light of Florida’s increasingly diverse population, the state might begin to 
lean Democratic. This environment explains why both campaigns devoted more resources – both 
in terms of time and money – to Florida than to any other state (Knuckey and Jewett 2018).  
In particular, Republican strategists might wonder about the ideal qualities that a 
candidate should have in order to win Florida’s prized electoral votes. The 2016 election gives us 
an opportunity to compare how two seemingly different types of Republican candidates perform 
in a battleground state like Florida. In order to understand the factors that explain the difference 
in support for President Trump and Senator Rubio in the 2016 general election in Florida, this 
study stars with a literature review that gives a historic overview of recent elections in the state, 
followed by a review of studies that shed light into which variables might affect vote choice. The 
study relies on bivariate and multivariate regression to analyze the effect of these variables on 
the level of support for each candidate, followed by two models that analyze the actual difference 
in the level of support for the candidates. 
Literature review 
The 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 presidential elections in Florida were among the closest 
in the country; and in 2012 the .09-point difference between Mitt Romney and Barack Obama 
represented the closest contest in any of the 50 states (MacManus, Jewett, et al. 2015, 116). 
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However, Florida was not always a decisive state. During the earliest years as a state, candidates 
had a tendency to win by comfortable margins (the average margin was about 14%) but the state 
had a high rate of “accuracy:” the winner of the election carried the state in 6 out of 7 elections 
during the “Statehood to Reconstruction” period (Jewett 2017). The state’s most important or 
influential role during this period came in the election of Rutherford Hayes, in which Florida was 
one of the decisive states (Jewett 2017). Following Reconstruction, the state became solidly 
Democratic until 1948, the only exception being the presidential election of 1928 (Jewett 2017). 
Starting with the 1952 election, Florida sided with the Republican candidate in 9 out of 11 
elections with exceptions only when Southern Democrats were at the top of the ballot (Jewett 
2017). This period is known as “the Presidential Republican Era” because even though the state 
was reliably Republican at the presidential level, the Democratic Party was still dominant in 
other statewide and local races (Jewett 2017). Beginning in 1996, the GOP began being 
successful at the state level, when Republicans gained control of the State House and held on to 
their Senate majority (Jewett 2017). In 1998, Jeb Bush became Governor and went on to be the 
first Republican Governor to win reelection in 2002 (Jewett 2017). During this time the average 
margin of victory for presidential candidates began to decrease: during the Post-Reconstruction 
era the mean margin of victory in the state was 38.2%, in the Presidential Republican era, it was 
14.6%, and during the Competitive era, a mere 2.6% (Jewett 2017). 
At the heart of this increase in competitiveness in the state we find explosive population 
growth, which has made Florida “one of the most diverse states in the country in terms of race, 
ethnicity, immigration, religion, and age” (Jewett 2017, 7). Republicans are catching up with 
Democrats in terms of party registration, with a meager 2.5 point gap separating the parties and 
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opinion polls show that ideology is evenly split, with 36% self-identifying as conservatives, 35% 
as moderates, and 23% as liberals (Jewett). Because campaigns perceive Florida to be a highly 
competitive state, they devote a significant portion of their resources to the state, which creates a 
self-fulfilling prophecy: voters become more engaged, turnout increases, and the election 
becomes more competitive (Jewett 2017). 
The 2000 presidential election in Florida gained worldwide attention and faced legal 
challenges, with President Bush emerging victorious with a 537-vote margin (MacManus, 
Jewett, et al. 2015, 117). The closeness of this election was surprising because many observers 
had forecasted that Bush would easily win Florida and as of late 1999, the Texas Governor 
enjoyed a 15-point lead over Vice President Gore in the state (Tauber and Hulbray 2002, 149). 
While Republicans had seemingly gained an advantage over the 1990s – Florida was even 
described as “the most Republican of the 10 largest states” following the 1998 mid-term 
elections – Republicans lost ground following the Clinton impeachment and Governor Jeb 
Bush’s decision to end affirmative action, a choice that alienated many African-Americans in the 
state (Tauber and Hulbray 2002, 150-151). 
The issue that dominated the 2004 election in Florida was terrorism, in a year when 
morality was the most important issue to voters nationally (MacManus, Everett, et al. 2005, 167). 
Nevertheless, social issues still contributed greatly to Bush’s success in Florida: 34% of voters 
were conservative and they overwhelmingly supported the incumbent President (MacManus, 
Everett, et al. 2005, 168). The 2004 election brought reform to elections in the state, as well as 
media and campaign attention: both candidates, then-President Bush and Senator John Kerry 
spent more than $40 million dollar on advertising in the state, and visited the state repeatedly 
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(MacManus, Jewett, et al. 2015, 117). Bush went on to win the state by a comfortable margin: 
52% compared to Kerry’s 47% (MacManus, Jewett, et al. 2015, 118). In this election, Democrats 
attempted to mobilize the “under-performing Democratic base,” namely non-Cuban Hispanics 
and African Americans, while Republicans tried to mobilize a coalition of “seniors, veterans, 
social conservatives, Hispanics, Jewish groups” (MacManus, Everett, et al. 2005, 156-157). In 
addition, both campaigns hoped that a highly-contested, open Senate race would increase turnout 
(MacManus, Everett, et al. 2005, 157). During this campaign season, advertising became much 
more targeted, and both campaigns clearly segmented the electorate based on several factors and 
characteristics; the Bush campaign and Republican groups were particularly effective in this 
effort (MacManus, Everett, et al. 2005, 162-163). In addition, the Bush campaign was more 
proactive in terms of reaching Hispanic voters in Spanish-language media than the Kerry 
campaign, something that many Hispanic Democrats were critical of (MacManus, Everett, et al. 
2005, 163). The 2004 election marked the first time that Hispanics represented a larger 
proportion of the Florida electorate than African American voters (MacManus, Everett, et al. 
2005, 170).  
The 2008 election created a lot of excitement among voters and during the final months 
was dominated by the economic recession. In the end, Barack Obama’s superior fundraising 
efforts coupled with better organization in the state, allowed him to beat Senator John McCain by 
a 3-point margin - 51% to McCain’s 48% (MacManus, Jewett, et al. 2015, 118-120). This 
outcome seemed almost impossible to Democrats following the 2004 election, when many 
Democrats in the state felt hopeless about the future; State Senator Skip Campbell, from 
Broward, declared, “we’re dead. Need CPR” (MacManus, Everett, et al. 2005, 179). Others, like 
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the State Party Chairman, were more optimist and acknowledged Florida’s reputation as a swing 
state: “the pendulum always swings back” (MacManus, Everett, et al. 2005, 180). 
The economy was a central focus of the presidential campaign in 2012, as the state was 
still facing the aftermath of the great recession, and both campaigns poured a great deal of 
resources into the state (MacManus, Jewett, et al. 2015, 120-121). Almost $80 million dollars 
were spent either by the Obama campaign or allied groups, trailing behind Romney’s total - $95 
million; in addition, Florida was second only to Ohio in terms of candidate and surrogate visits 
(Knuckey and Branz 2014). In the end, the election was the closest in the country, and was 
almost subject to an automatic recount, but President Obama carried the state, and won four 
more years in the White House (MacManus, Jewett, et al. 2015, 120-121). 
In 2016, both presidential campaigns made Florida a central element of their strategy: 
while Florida has been a “luxury” to some Democratic candidates in the past (they could have 
won the Electoral College without Florida’s electors), many people thought that a Clinton victory 
in Florida would have made it exceedingly hard for Donald Trump to reach 270 electors 
(Knuckey and Jewett 2018). The general election campaign started immediately following the 
conventions, with the Clinton campaign trying to inflict so much damage to Donald Trump’s 
image among voters that it would be virtually impossible for him to recover – Clinton efforts 
began in August, when the Trump campaign had not yet aired a single TV ad (Knuckey and 
Jewett 2018). The Clinton campaign also devoted significant resources to their “ground game” 
and opened 14 offices throughout the state; the Trump campaign only opened one office in 
Sarasota (Knuckey and Jewett 2018). The Trump campaign believed that mass rallies (which 
many cable news channels carried live to a much broader audience) and Trump’s status as a part-
 7 
time Floridian would help him win Florida’s 29 Electoral College votes (Knuckey and Jewett 
2018). 
Senate races in Florida have been competitive in the last few years, especially when there 
have been open seats following the retirement of a Senator, a condition that prompts very 
qualified candidates to run (MacManus, Jewett, et al. 2015, 135). But Senate races in Florida 
have not always been competitive: before the 1968 election, Democrats had enjoyed a stronghold 
in the state since the Reconstruction Era. Edward Gurney’s election to the U.S. Senate in 1968, 
therefore, marked the first Republican victory in a Senatorial race in the state since 
Reconstruction (MacManus, Jewett, et al. 2015, 135).  
The state's demographic trends might lead us to expect Democratic dominance – in fact, 
following the 2012 election, some observers suggested that Florida was “emerging as a state that 
now leans Democratic” due to the changed political environment born out of increased diversity 
and the increased importance of Hispanic voters (Knuckey and Branz). The state's non-Hispanic 
White population has declined significantly over the last two decades, from 65% in 2000 to 56% 
in 2015 (Khimm 2015, 50). Moreover, the ideological preferences of younger Cuban Americans 
have shifted away from the Republican Party, and new Hispanic immigrants like Puerto Ricans 
tend to lean Democratic (Khimm 2015). Obama even carried the Cuban-American vote in 2012, 
by a 2-point margin (49% to Romney’s 47%) (Knuckey and Branz 2014). While Obama's 
success in the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections relied on a "coalition of young and minority 
voters" reminiscent of the prediction made by Judis and Teixeira in The Emerging Democratic 
Majority, many political analysts, including Judis himself, have noted that demographics are not 
destiny, while suggesting that Republicans could be successful in light of increasing diversity by 
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forming a coalition of "middle-income voters across racial groups" (Khimm 2015, 50, 53). In 
other words, the economic voter might trump the racial voter.  
For years, conventional wisdom has dictated that to win in Florida, it was important to 
engage Hispanic voters. In 2012, for example, a central element of both presidential campaigns 
in Florida was to target Hispanic voters (MacManus, Jewett, et al. 2015, 121). Following the 
Democratic National Convention in 2012, then-President Obama’s first campaign stop in Florida 
was in Osceola County, where he aimed to gain the support of Puerto Rican immigrants by 
highlighting the anti-immigrant stances of many Republicans (MacManus, Jewett, et al. 2015, 
121). The President highlighted how his proposals to deal with national issues like the economy, 
education, or health care reform aligned with their interests, and voiced support for proposals 
such as the DREAM Act (Knuckey and Branz 2014). Republicans also made a point of courting 
the Puerto Rican vote in the Central Florida area, but chose to highlight the bad economic 
conditions created by Democrats, because the economy was the most important issue to most 
Hispanic-Americans according to polls (MacManus, Jewett, et al. 2015, 121). Much of 
Romney’s efforts were hurt by the “tough line” he adopted during the Republican primary, 
suggesting that undocumented immigrants should self-deport; but during the general election 
campaign the Republican candidate softened his stance to a certain extent by noting he supported 
Senator Rubio’s plan to grant lawful permanent residency to immigrants who served in the 
military (Knuckey and Branz 2014). In addition, President Bush’s success in the state in the 2004 
election can be partly explained because he significantly outspent Kerry in the Tampa, Orlando, 
and Miami media markets in terms of advertising targeting Hispanic voters (Bishin and Klofstad 
2009, 575).  
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Yet Trump’s campaign seems to have ignored these precedents. His rhetoric angered 
many Hispanics and it led to a surge in registration among members of these groups in the state, 
something that undoubtedly worried Republicans (Knuckey and Jewett 2018). In addition, 
Trump decided to run an English-only campaign (Goldmacher 2016).  
While Hispanic voters might be increasing in numbers, their political influence may not 
increase proportionally. First, Hispanic voters are often grouped into a single group, but it is 
important to remember that individuals within the same ethnic or racial background often 
disagree (Bishin and Klofstad 2009, 572). While panethnicity – the belief that members of a 
certain demographic group behave in similar ways when it comes to political behavior – is a 
common assumption in political analysis, it is not correct to assume that ethnic and racial groups 
behave in a homogenous manner (Bishin and Klofstad 2009, 572). Hispanics "have roots in more 
than 19 countries" and many Hispanics identify with the identity of their country of origin (e.g., 
Colombian-American) rather than with the Hispanic or Latino group (Bishin and Klofstad 2009, 
572-573). In addition, ethnicity and race by themselves do not define elections. For example, 
Puerto Ricans appear to have been crucial to President Bush's success in Florida in the 2004 
election (Bishin and Klofstad 2009). Bishin and Klofstad demonstrate that the results of their 
study can be explained by the mobilization efforts by the Bush campaign targeting recent Puerto 
Rican immigrants who do not have strong attachments to either party (574-575).  
Indeed, research on political behavior has long sustained the idea that social 
characteristics only affect vote choice indirectly (Flanigan and Zingale 2010). In The American 
Voter, Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stoke presented the concept of the funnel of causality to 
explain all the different factors that affect vote choice and to what extent they do so (Flanigan 
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and Zingale 2010, 209-210). At the widest end of this funnel, we would find social 
characteristics such as "race, gender, social class, and levels of education" which, while affecting 
political attitudes, have the least direct effect on vote choice. Long-term predispositions, such as 
partisanship and ideology, do have a more significant influence on vote choice than social 
characteristics, but these predispositions are hardly the sole factor or the most important 
influence on vote choice. It is also important to remember that social characteristics affect 
partisan affiliation and ideology. Opinions about issues, parties, and candidates are affected by 
both social characteristics and long-term predispositions, and these attitudes are the ones more 
closely linked to vote choice as they are short-term forces (Flanigan and Zingale 2010). If there 
are enough short-term forces and voters have access to information about them, these forces will 
have a more substantial impact on vote choice than partisanship and ideology. Therefore, if a 
very important situation, issue, or candidate characteristic is present in a given election cycle, a 
strong partisan might switch her vote to another party (Flanigan and Zingale 2010, 214-216).  
Some studies suggest that in 2016, voting was more influenced by attitudes than 
demographic characteristics (Smith and Hanley 2018, 197). The authors argue that explaining 
Trump’s victory in terms of “the white working class” is erroneous because Trump voters were 
unlikely to be unemployed or sub-employed: they earn more than the average American, they 
tend to have little contact with immigrant workers, and only 10% are employed by the 
manufacturing industry (Smith and Hanley 2018, 197). In addition, the 2016 American National 
Election Study (ANES) found that Trump voters felt secure economically (Smith and Hanley 
2018, 198). While demographic factors – “education, gender, age, marital status, and income” – 
affected vote choice, attitudes were the most important factor according to the authors (Smith 
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and Hanley 2018, 198). For example, a one-point increase in a scale of attitudes favorable to a 
dominant leader made it 16.2% more likely for a voter to support Trump; for a negative 
prejudice against immigrants the figure was 22%, and against African-Americans 19.4% (Smith 
and Hanley 2018, 199). The eight attitudes that predict Trump support are “conservative 
identification; support for domineering leaders; fundamentalism; prejudice against immigrants, 
African Americans, Muslims, and women; and pessimism about the economy” (Smith and 
Hanley 2018, 206). These attitudes were more common among older voters, those with lower 
levels of educational attainment, and male voters (Smith and Hanley 2018, 206). 
Political campaigns devout a lot of time and resources to change political views, but 
political scholars have researched for decades now if campaigns have an effect at all on public 
opinion and vote choice given, for example, that some forecasting models that rely on economic 
data alone have been able to accurately predict who could win long before campaigning begins 
(Flanigan and Zingale 2010, 173, 190-191). However, political operatives still trust in the power 
of campaigns, perhaps because weak partisans and independents are more likely to be undecided 
by the time the general campaign starts; this means that around 10 to 15% of voters could 
potentially be persuaded (Flanigan and Zingale 2010, 191).  
Many Americans associate the idea of presidential campaigning with campaign visits, a 
type of strategy “irresistible” to campaigns and the press corps (Wood 2016, 110). Campaign 
strategists like campaign visits because the travel itself provides a way to bond with members of 
the national press, which might in turn soften their coverage and present the candidate in a better 
light to the public (Wood 2016, 111). In addition, campaign visits provide an opportunity for the 
candidate to discuss local and state issues and gain local press coverage (Wood 2016, 111). If the 
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visit is successful, it might inspire attendees to participate in the campaign by contributing their 
money or their time (Wood 2016, 111). The presidential and vice-presidential candidates made a 
historic number of visits to Florida in the 2016 presidential cycle: 71 – the belief that Florida was 
crucial forced campaigns to devote more of their resources to the Sunshine state than any other 
state (Jewett 2017) (Knuckey and Jewett 2018). 
However, do campaign visits truly affect vote choice? In terms of affecting local media 
coverage, Wood’s research found that the effects were very modest, with a slightly more 
significant impact on print media rather than on television; the net effect was typically “no more 
than three extra stories following a visit” (Wood 2016, 119). Wood’s research, however, did not 
account for the tone of the coverage – it certainly could have been more positive following the 
visit (Wood 2016, 119). An interesting finding is that within battleground states, key, pivotal 
areas were not the most frequently visited, suggesting that the intent of campaigns is to influence 
national press coverage (Wood 2016, 123). When it comes to the effect of campaign visits on 
mass attitudes, Wood found “very strong partisan effects on respondents’ perceptions of recent 
candidate visits” (Wood 2016, 120). Partisans were likely to report a visit of their preferred 
candidate, even if the candidate had not visited (Wood 2016, 121). Wood also found that “within 
a battleground state, but outside of the specific visited market, coverage of a visit is 
indistinguishable from generic campaign coverage from across the presidential battleground;” 
the effects of visits, therefore, are “strongly geographically contained” (Wood 2016, 121, 124). 
Independent voters were the ones most affected by campaign visits – a visit by Governor 
Romney, for example, increased an independent voter’s probability of voting for the Republican 
candidate by 5% - and independents were the only group affected by visits for more than two 
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days (Wood 2016, 123). Other studies have found more significant effects. Heersink and 
Peterson studied the effects of campaign visits in the 1948 election, and found that Truman’s 
visits improved his election outcomes in the counties where he made appearances – the mean 
improvement was 3.06 percentage points – which could have affected the result in Ohio (50). 
The authors also found that Dewey’s visits did not significantly improve his performance, and 
had little effect, perhaps even a negative one (Heersink and Peterson 2017, 50). The authors posit 
that this difference is due to the quality of the visits, and the different stump styles of each 
candidate (Heersink and Peterson 2017, 50). Truman was able to connect with the crowds more 
effectively – he tended to make references to local sports teams, for example, as a way to 
connect with the locals – while Dewey’s style was flat (Heersink and Peterson 2017, 52-53). 
While the results suggest that campaign visits can have a positive effect, they “do not guarantee 
improved performance” because candidate quality is an important factor in the effectiveness of 
campaign visits (Heersink and Peterson 2017, 63).  
In addition, other studies have found that in battleground states, such as Florida, where 
political activity is most intense, campaigning can "activate factors such as race, ideology, 
partisanship, and presidential approval" (McClurg and Holbrook 2009, 495). While all voters are 
exposed to campaign messages, voters in battleground states get to experience campaigning 
directly, without the media or other actors interfering; there is less noise and there is more room 
for the message to be received as expected by campaign strategists (McClurg and Holbrook 
2009, 497). McClurg and Holbrook's study found that campaigning "activates" certain tendencies 
among voters; for example, the relationship between ideology and vote choice was much 
stronger in battleground states than in non-competitive states, and the authors noted that the 
 14 
explanation lies in the fact that campaign messages aim to target and activate certain attitudes 
voters already have, as previously described by Campbell in 2000 and Gelman and King in 1993 
(McClurg and Holbrook 2009, 498-499).  
Moreover, McClurg and Holbrook found that economic voting is less common in 
battleground states, and the authors posit two explanations: because the evaluation of presidential 
performance is a key determinant of vote choice in battleground states, the economic evaluation 
is implicit in that evaluation (i.e.: if a voter approves of the economy's direction, it is more likely 
he will approve of the President's performance overall). A second explanation is a complex 
relationship between several variables such as partisan affiliation, approval of presidential 
performance, and economic evaluation. 
Despite several high-profile events that shook up the presidential race (Hillary Clinton’s 
collapse during a 9/11 memorial event, the Access Hollywood tape in which Donald Trump 
made crude comments about women, and James Comey’s statement about re-opening the 
investigation on Clinton’s emails, among others) public opinion polls remained relatively stable 
throughout the race, and the final poll in the state forecasted a small lead for Clinton (Knuckey 
and Jewett 2018). This might suggest that the campaign did not have a strong effect on vote 
choice and that the fundamentals, such as the state of the economy, might have played an 
important role.  
McClurg and Holbrook cite Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee's 1954 study on the 1948 
presidential election, which gives credence to the idea that campaigns can give more salience to 
certain issues in voters' minds (501). This point could be relevant because much of Trump's 
message focused on immigration, "unfair trade deals" as the source of economic malaise; issues 
 15 
that otherwise, probably would not have been at the center of the election. Just like Truman was 
able to shift the focus from foreign policy to "class-related issues" Trump might have been able 
to activate certain sentiments in voters, such as the notion of feeling like an outsider in your own 
country.  
And that activation process might explain Trump's success. Victor Devinatz, notes that 
the 2016 election marked the first time since the New Deal was passed when members of 
organized labor did not follow the advice of union leaders and opted to vote for Donald Trump 
instead of labor-endorsed Hillary Clinton (Devinatz 2017, 233). Trump's message might have 
been able to overcome not only $100 million in labor spending but the effort of volunteers from 
this sector who devoted many hours to make phone calls and other efforts to support Clinton; in 
the end Clinton's performance was the worst of any Democratic candidate in terms of union 
member support (Devinatz 2017, 233-234). While the support of the white working class to a 
candidate who was not endorsed by union leaders may surprise some observers, it is not 
unprecedented: George Wallace received the support of the white working class in the 1968 
presidential election, and both candidates relied on a similar campaign message (Devinatz 2017, 
234). What can the Wallace experience teach us about Trump? Wallace earned the support of 
people with less educational attainment and lower income levels, and his support was higher 
among "manual workers" (Devinatz 2017, 235). Devinatz explains Clinton's lackluster 
performance by noting that she did not target union members as workers, but instead chose to 
focus on racial and ethnic issues, which could have alienated white workers (236). In addition, 
while labor organizations were able to "make significant inroads in Wallace's backing among 
union members in 1986," they could not do the same in 2016 because economic conditions have 
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changed significantly, and the quality of jobs has decreased substantially, and many workers 
might have placed the blame on trade agreements, a centerpiece of Trump's campaign message 
(Devinatz 2017, 236).  
Inglehart and Norris argue that times of economic instability or insecurity create political 
conditions in which "authoritarian xenophobic" candidates may be able to succeed, while 
economic prosperity leads to more willingness to accept foreigners and openness (443). The 
increasing economic inequality has created an environment that fosters populism in many 
Western countries, including the United States; and while these parties and candidates are not a 
new feature of politics in these countries, they have been especially successful in the last few 
years (Inglehart and Norris 2017, 444-445).  
Robert Erikson (1989) notes that political scientists have found significant evidence that 
suggests that the economy is a major factor that explains vote choice, and that income change, in 
particular, is a peculiarly good predictor of presidential vote (567). Erikson relied on partial 
correlation to analyze the relationship between vote choice and income change and found a value 
of .89 (568). Erikson notes that other factors such as candidate quality and campaigns do have an 
effect, but economic conditions do have a significant influence on election outcomes (569). In 
addition, he notes that the economy could also have indirect effects on elections: low-quality 
candidates might emerge to represent an incumbent President's party if the economy is in poor 
shape, because more qualified candidates might not be willing to run under those challenging 
conditions, or voters could evaluate candidates based on the state of the economy instead of their 
own personal qualities and qualifications (570). 
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And while some elections, like the 2000 presidential elections, might seem like an outlier 
(a problem when we are considering few cases), some studies have found that economic 
fundamentals are nevertheless a significant factor that explains presidential vote choice. While 
economic growth itself may not explain vote choice, income growth, measured as "percent 
change in real disposable income per capita in 12 months prior to the election" is a relevant 
factor in vote choice, with an R squared value of .54 (Bartels and Zaller 2001, 10). The authors 
examined the effect of other variables on vote choice, and conclude that economic variables can 
be so dominant in research because they are the ones that politicians cannot easily control: they 
have a measure of control over other factors, such as messaging and campaign strategy, and note 
that their "results provide little support for simple-minded economic determinism" (Bartels and 
Zaller 2001, 17). In a close election, a factor like ideological moderation, for example, can be 
decisive: the authors found that a candidate who was perceived as ideologically extreme when 
contrasted with their opponent could lose up to "three percentage points of the popular vote" 
(Bartels and Zaller 2001, 16). 
However, can the rise of populism be explained by economic factors alone? Inglehart and 
Norris found that cultural factors are more likely to explain the success of populist candidates 
such as Trump than economic factors (446). The authors also found that economic factors are 
"weak predictors" of the populist vote, which is why exit polls showed that Clinton received the 
support of voters who were worried about the economy, while voters who thought that 
immigration was the most crucial problem facing the country cast their votes for Trump 
(Inglehart and Norris 2017, 446). That being said, economic factors can make cultural 
considerations more salient: negative feelings about immigrants are more common during times 
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of economic uncertainty, something the country is experiencing despite high growth, as real 
income is declining and inequality is rising (Inglehart and Norris 2017, 447).  
Inglehart and Norris argue that economic factors were superseded by a "powerful 
emotional reaction" and cite Arlie Hochschild's book Strangers in Their Own Land to explain 
what's behind this feeling: the transition to an Artificial Intelligence society has left many less-
educated Americans behind, and they feel like some groups are benefiting at their expense; the 
authors note that Donald Trump's rhetoric provided "emotional support" as he validated their 
feelings instead of merely dismissing them as “bigots,” and provided their concerns with a 
platform (Inglehart and Norris 2017, 452).  
Teigen, Shaw, and McKee examined the "relationship between population density, racial 
context, and the preferences of black and white voters in the 2008 and 2012 elections" and the 
result of their analysis provides more evidence of the cultural element involved in voting. The 
authors found that both density and racial composition of a given area (they studied ZIP codes) 
affect vote choice, and that white voters, in particular, are susceptible to these factors (Teigen, 
Shaw and McKee 2017, 2). The authors also found support for the racial threat and contact 
hypothesis (as described by Sigelman and Welch in 1993): their study showed that in rural areas 
with a high concentration of minority residents, white voters were less likely to vote for Obama 
while in contrast, white voters who lived in urban areas with high levels of minority residents 
were more likely to vote for Obama (Teigen, Shaw and McKee 2017, 4). They explain that white 
voters in rural areas are less likely to have contact with minority residents because population 
density is low, whereas in areas with higher population density, it is more likely that people will 
have contact with others from a wider variety of backgrounds (Teigen, Shaw and McKee 2017, 
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5). As a result, we might see disproportionate support for Donald Trump in Florida's most rural 
counties.  
The purpose of this thesis is to compare Trump’s results in the 2016 presidential election 
in Florida with those of another Republican candidate who ran in a statewide race: Senator 
Marco Rubio. There are obviously differences between Presidential and Senatorial elections. It is 
easier for voters to obtain information in a presidential race, and that makes it easier for short-
term forces to become more important than long-term attitudes like partisanship, and as a result, 
it is possible that some partisans may vote for another party’s candidate at the presidential level, 
but not as likely in a legislative race (Flanigan and Zingale 2010, 233). This is particularly true in 
U.S. House of Representatives races, in which it is difficult for voters to find information about 
candidates, in particular about challenges, which forces voters to rely on “shortcuts” such as 
partisan affiliation; incumbency, therefore, becomes an important factor (Flanigan and Zingale 
2010, 233). Senate races, are more visible, and we see more use of TV advertising, for example, 
which means that a challenger with a good plan and enough money might be able to get enough 
information to voters and be able to overcome partisanship and name recognition; in fact, 
incumbency in the Senate can become a problem if the Senator has a controversial voting record 
(Flanigan and Zingale 2010, 233). 
Senate elections tend to be more contested than House races (Jacobson and Carson). 
Challengers tend to have more experience which makes them stronger candidates; this was true 
of Marco Rubio’s challenger in the general election: Patrick Murphy was a member of the U.S. 
House of Representatives (Jacobson and Carson 2016, 134). Because challengers have 
experience and have more chances of winning, they tend to find fundraising easier, too; not to 
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mention that interest groups are more interested in access to members of the Senate than the 
House, which means that more money is up for grabs in Senatorial races (Jacobson and Carson 
2016, 135). In addition, Senate races receive more media coverage than House races, which 
means that candidates get access to more free or earned media (Jacobson and Carson 2016, 135). 
These factors, which make a Senate race more competitive than a House race, also explain why 
comparing Donald Trump and Marco Rubio’s outcomes make sense: while a Senate race may 
not receive as much attention as a presidential race, voters still have access to a significant 
amount of information.  
Because Senate elections are almost as visible as presidential elections, there is an 
interesting question regarding the effect that they have on each other. Campbell and Sumners 
examined whether Senate races are “subject to the influence of presidential coattails” and 
whether the opposite could be true as well (Campbell and Sumners 1990, 514, 517). The authors 
examined Senate races held in presidential election years from 1972 to 1988 and found a positive 
correlation between Senate and Presidential election vote choice (Campbell and Sumners 1990, 
517). While the coattail effect is not determinant or the strongest factor in Senate elections, it is a 
relevant variable, and the authors also found that, although Senate elections can in some cases be 
as visible as presidential races, there is no “reverse coattail” effect (Campbell and Sumners 1990, 
517). The authors also cite Abramowitz, Stewart and other researchers who identified factors that 
affect Senate election outcomes: some of these only affect Senatorial races, while others affect 
both Senatorial and Presidential elections (Campbell and Sumners 1990, 514). Party affiliation, 
ideology, and the “trend of greater support for Republican candidates” during the period they 
studied were common variables in both types of races (Campbell and Sumners 1990, 515). 
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Incumbency, along with spending, divisiveness of the election, and prior electoral results in the 
state were factors that affected the Senate election only (Campbell and Sumners 1990, 515).  
While many things have changed since Campbell and Sumners’ study was published in 
1990 – the authors note, for example, the “diminished importance of partisanship,” a 
characteristic that does not necessarily apply to the 2016 elections – their results suggest that 
Trump and Rubio’s election results should be similar.  
 Donald Trump performed well in traditionally Republican areas; Knuckey and Jewett 
found “an almost perfect relationship” between Trump and Romney’s performance in Florida’s 
67 counties (Pearson’s r = .97) and that Donald Trump did not win in Democratic enclaves; he 
only won four “Obama counties:” Indian River, Jefferson, Monroe, and Pinellas. In addition, the 
authors’ regression analysis found that the variables that explained why Trump over performed 
(or underperformed) relative to Romney were percentage of Hispanic residents in a county, level 
of educational attainment (“percentage with a college degree”) and median income (Knuckey 
and Jewett 2018). 
 Table 1 displays selected Florida exit poll results from 2016 for President Trump and 
Senator Rubio. Rubio received 5 percent or higher support than Trump from the following 
groups: Cubans, Non-Cuban Hispanics, high school or less, income under $50,000, 
independents, urban voters and from people that thought that the economy was the most 
important issue, the condition of the economy was good, and whose financial situation was about 
the same as four years ago. Rubio received substantially less support than Trump from people 
who thought that illegal immigrants should be deported.   
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Table 1: Selected Florida 2016 General Election Exit Poll Results  
Category Trump Rubio Difference 
Female 46% 50% 4% 
65 and older 57% 55% 2% 
White 64% 62% 2% 
Cuban 54% 68% 14% 
Non-Cuban Hispanic 26% 39% 13% 
High school or less 46% 53% 7% 
Whites, no degree 66% 62% 4% 
Income under $50k 42% 51% 9% 
Income between $50k and $100k 52% 54% 2% 
Income greater than $100k 56% 58% 2% 
Republicans 89% 91% 2% 
Democrats 8% 12% 4% 
Independents 47% 52% 5% 
Immigration most important issue 69% 70% 1% 
Economy most important issue 46% 51% 5% 
Illegal immigrants should be offered legal status 33% 36% 3% 
Illegal immigrants should be deported 92% 84% 8% 
Immigrants hurt the country 87% 84% 3% 
Trade takes away U.S. jobs 70% 66% 4% 
Condition of national economy: good 14% 19% 5% 
Condition of national economy: poor 67% 70% 3% 
Financial situation compared to four years ago: better 20% 24% 4% 
Financial situation compared to four years ago: worse 70% 70% 0% 
Financial situation compared to four years ago: about 
the same 
51% 57% 6% 
Life for the next generation of Americans will be: 
worse than today 
65% 68% 3% 
Urban voters 41% 47% 6% 
Suburban voters 53% 54% 1% 
Rural voters 61% 64% 3% 
 
Source: CNN. 
Categories in which the difference in support for Trump and Rubio is equal or greater than five 
are highlighted.  
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THEORIES EXPLAINING VOTE CHOICE IN PRESIDENTIAL AND SENATORIAL 
ELECTIONS 
 
Economic voting: economic voting suggests that the performance of the economy is a major 
factor that influences vote choice. This theory holds that voters evaluate politicians from an 
economics-based perspective: they are more likely to support a candidate from the incumbent 
president’s party if the economy is doing well and just as likely to seek change if they believe the 
economy is performing poorly. In particular, several studies have found income change to be a 
particularly good predictor of vote choice. In addition, we know that people vote based on their 
own self-interest: voters will support candidates they perceive will benefit people in their income 
group. In terms of economic voting, we should see very little difference between Trump and 
Rubio. Economic considerations cloud all other variables; for example, evaluation of candidate 
characteristics depends on performance of the economy. Since both Trump and Rubio are 
members of the Republican Party, the opposition party, they should have performed better in 
counties with lower income growth, higher unemployment rate, lower median household income, 
and higher percentage in poverty. If economic voting applies to the 2016 election in Florida, then 
we’d see little to no difference in the voting patterns of Trump and Rubio despite their different 
campaign messages: they’d perform as well as any other generic Republican. This theory 
includes variables like: median household income, real income change, unemployment rate, and 
percent of population in poverty.  
Cultural voting: cultural voting suggests that attitudes and prejudices are the driving force 
behind vote choice or political behavior. Cultural voting theory holds that voting can be a highly 
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emotional act, responsive to fears about the future, increased automation in the workforce, and 
changing cultural norms as a result of immigration patterns. This theory includes variables like: 
percent of foreign-born population, percent of population that speaks a language other than 
English at home, and population density. Because Trump’s message appealed to emotions about 
immigration, its effects on American culture, and the changing economy in a way that other 
candidates – even from his own party – could not, then these variables should be strongly related 
to his level of support. In addition, because these variables affected Trump’s level of support 
more than Rubio’s, these variables should also be strongly related to the difference in support for 
the Republican candidates.  
Demographic voting: Demographic voting theory holds that social characteristics are the major 
determinant of vote choice. It includes variables like: race, gender, age, and level of educational 
attainment.  
Campaign/political communication: This theory holds that campaigns and events affect vote 
choice. It includes variables like campaign visits and amount of advertising spending.   
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HYPOTHESES 
 Based on previous literature, exit polls, and theory a number of hypotheses are proposed. 
The first set seeks explanations for the Republican victories in the 2016 presidential race and 
senate race in Florida. The second set suggests plausible reasons why Rubio won by more than 
Trump. 
Hypotheses that apply to both Trump and Rubio 
 H1: There is a positive relationship between the Republican percentage of the vote 
(President and Senate) and unemployment rate. The higher the unemployment rate, the higher his 
share of the vote. Voters will often blame candidates from the incumbent President’s party for 
adverse economic conditions, so if the unemployment rate is higher, it’s less likely that they’ll 
support Democratic candidates. In addition, Donald Trump made jobs and the economy a central 
focus of his campaign. 
 H2: There is a negative relationship between the Republican percentage of the vote 
(President and Senate) and real income growth. The larger the increase in income, the more 
likely it is that voters will perceive that the economy is performing well, thus making them more 
likely to support the incumbent party.  
 H3: There is a positive relationship between the Republican percentage of the vote 
(President and Senate) and median household income. Exit polls found that there was a positive 
relationship between income level and the likelihood of supporting Trump. Alternatively, it 
might be the case that if voters are to make evaluations about the state of the economy, they 
might take into account how much their relatives, neighbors, and other members of their 
community are earning, and the lower the median household income, the lower their approval of 
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the performance of the economy will be, making them more likely to vote for candidates of the 
opposition party.  
 H4: There is a positive relationship between the Republican percentage of the vote 
(President and Senate) and the percentage of the population in poverty. While poorer people 
were more likely to support Clinton and Murphy, the number of people living with incomes 
below the poverty line might affect voters’ perception of the economy regardless of their own 
income level; therefore, the higher the poverty rate, the more likely voters were to support 
Republican candidates.  
H5: There is a positive relationship between the Republican percentage of the vote 
(President and Senate) and the percentage of white voters in a county. Exit polls found that white 
voters overwhelmingly supported Trump (64%), while a similar number expressed support for 
Rubio (62%).   
 H6: There is a negative relationship between the Republican percentage of the vote 
(President and Senate) and the percentage of non-Cuban Hispanic residents in a county. Exit 
polls show that Clinton overwhelmingly won the support of non-Cuban Hispanic voters (62%) 
and that Murphy had a slight edge over Rubio among voters in this demographic group (50% to 
Rubio’s 48%).  
 H7: There is a positive relationship between the Republican percentage of the vote 
(President and Senate) and the percentage of Cuban residents in a county. Exit polls found that 
Cuban voters supported Trump (54%) and Rubio (68%). 
 H8: There is a negative relationship between the Republican percentage of the vote 
(President and Senate) and the percentage of African-American voters in a county. African-
 27 
Americans strongly favored Clinton, with 84% of blacks casting a vote for her, while 8% 
supported Trump. In the Senate race, African-Americans strongly favored Murphy, with 80% of 
blacks casting a vote for Murphy, while 17% supported Rubio. 
 H9: There is a negative relationship between the Republican percentage of the vote 
(President and Senate) and the percentage of female residents in a county. Exit polls found that 
Democratic candidates received a greater level of support than the Republican candidates (46% 
of women supported Trump while 50% of women voted for Rubio).  
 H10: There is a positive relationship between the Republican percentage of the vote 
(President and Senate) and the percentage of residents aged 65 and older. Both Republican 
candidates received significant support from this demographic group according to exit polls: 
57% of these voters supported Trump, and 55% voted for Rubio.  
H11: There is positive relationship between the Republican percentage of the vote 
(President and Senate) and the percentage of whites with a high school diploma or less. Because 
these voters are the ones most likely to be “left behind” by the changes occurring in the 
economy, it’s likely that their evaluation of the economy was more negative, making them more 
likely to seek change.  
 H12: There is a positive relationship between the Republican percentage of the vote 
(President and Senate) and the number of Trump visits to a county. The Trump campaign relied 
on massive rallies as a way to mobilize their base, and Senator Rubio might have benefited from 
a coattail effect.  
H13: There is a negative relationship between the Republican percentage of the vote 
(President and Senate) and the percentage of foreign-born residents in a county. Given the anti-
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immigrant rhetoric of the Trump campaign, it’s likely that voters in counties with a high 
proportion of foreign-born residents will vote for Democrats: even if some of these foreign-born 
residents are not naturalized citizens, contact with immigrants might make voters less responsive 
to anti-immigration rhetoric.   
H14: There is a negative relationship between the Republican percentage of the vote 
(President and Senate) and the percentage of residents who speak a language other than English 
at home. As in the previous hypothesis, contact with people from different cultural backgrounds 
might make voters more likely to support legal immigration, thus making them less likely to 
support Republican candidates. 
H15: There is a negative relationship between the Republican percentage of the vote 
(President and Senate) and population per square mile. Urban voters are more likely to support 
Democratic candidates, while suburban and rural voters tend to support Republican candidates.  
Hypotheses that apply to the difference between Trump and Rubio1: 
H16: There is a negative relationship between the difference in support for Trump and 
Rubio and county unemployment rate. Since Trump campaigned on pursuing a different course 
for the economy, and made that a central part of his campaign, counties with high unemployment 
may show more support for Trump than for Rubio. 
H17: There is a positive relationship between the difference in support for Trump and 
Rubio and county economic growth rate. Trump’s promise of economic policy change may 
resonate less with voters who live in counties already experiencing strong economic growth.  
                                                      
1 As discussed below, this is measured as the Rubio percent of vote minus the Trump percent of vote in a county. 
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H18: There is a positive relationship between the difference in support for Trump and 
Rubio and the percentage of non-Cuban Hispanic residents in a county. While exit polls indicate 
neither Republican received majority support from non-Cuban Hispanics who tend to vote 
Democratic, Trump did significantly worse than Rubio. This may be due to Trump’s harsh 
language concerning illegal immigration from Mexico and other Latin American countries.  
H19: There is a positive relationship between the difference in support for Trump and 
Rubio and the percentage of Cuban residents in a county. Exit polls show that both candidates 
received a majority of Cuban votes in Florida. However, Rubio polled better than Trump among 
Floridians who identify as Cuban. Rubio’s parents fled Cuban after the Castro takeover and 
Rubio has deep roots and friendships in the Cuban community in South Florida.  
H20: There is a positive relationship between the difference in support for Trump and 
Rubio and the percentage of female voters in a county. Trump’s crude private comments about 
women became a major national story and thus women on average may vote for Rubio more than 
they vote for Trump. 
H21: There is a negative relationship between the difference in support for Trump and 
Rubio and the percentage of white residents in a county with less than a high school diploma. 
Trump’s rhetoric targeting low educated whites, left behind by automation and international 
trade and fearful of illegal immigration, should result in a higher vote for him among these voters 
compared to Rubio Exit polls show that Rubio outperformed Trump among all voters without a 
high school degree but that Trump did better than Rubio among white voters with no degree.  
H22: There is a positive relationship between the difference in support for Trump and 
Rubio and the percentage of residents who make less than $50,000 a year. Exit polls found a 9-
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point difference in support for Trump and Rubio among voters in this category (Rubio 51%, 
Trump 42%).  
H23: There is a positive relationship between the difference in support for Trump and 
Rubio and the percentage of voters registered with no party affiliation or a minor party. Exit 
polls found that Rubio won the support of 52% of voters who identified as independents, while 
Trump obtained the support of 47% of these voters. While identifying as independent is not the 
same as registering with no party affiliation or supporting a minor party, it’s likely that self-
identification and registration overlap. 
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Table 2: Hypotheses Summary 
Hypothesis Independent Variable Relationship 
Hypotheses that apply to both Trump and Rubio 
(Dependent variable: Republican percentage of the vote) 
1 Unemployment rate Positive 
2 Income growth Negative 
3 Median household income Positive 
4 Percentage of the population in poverty Positive 
5 Percentage of white voters Positive 
6 Percentage of non-Cuban Hispanic residents Negative 
7 Percentage of Cuban residents Positive 
8 Percentage of African-American voters Negative 
9 Percentage of female residents Negative 
10 Percentage of residents aged 65 and older Positive 
11 
Percentage of whites with a less than a High School 
diploma 
Positive 
12 Number of Trump visits to a county Positive 
13 Percentage of foreign-born residents in a county Negative 
14 
Percentage of residents who speak a language other than 
English at home 
Negative 
15 Population per square mile Negative 
Hypotheses that apply to the difference between Trump and Rubio 
(Dependent variable: Rubio support minus Trump support) 
16 County unemployment rate Negative 
17 County income growth Positive 
18 Percentage of non-Cuban Hispanic residents Positive 
19 Percentage of Cuban residents Positive 
20 Percentage of female residents Positive 
21 Percentage of residents with a high school diploma or less  Negative 
22 Percentage of residents who make less than $50k  Positive 
23 Percentage of voters registered with no party affiliation Positive 
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METHODOLOGY AND MEASUREMENT 
 
In order to answer the research question, I will use regression analysis for a cross section of data 
from the 2016 general election in Florida. The unit of analysis will be each of Florida’s 67 
counties. Information about the following variables will be collected to explain the variables that 
affected Trump’s level of support, Rubio’s level of support, and the differences between their 
respective levels of support.  
Dependent Variables  
Trump’s percentage of the vote – Trump’s percentage of the vote represents the proportion of the 
vote received by Trump in a county, expressed as a percentage of total votes casted in the 
presidential election. This information can be obtained from the “Election Results” website 
published by the Florida Department of State.  
Rubio’s percentage of the vote – Rubio’s percentage of the vote represents the proportion of the 
vote received by Rubio in a county, expressed as a percentage of total votes casted in the Senate 
election. This information can be obtained from the “Election Results” website published by the 
Florida Department of State.  
Difference in support for Trump and Rubio – this is the net difference between the percentage of 
the vote received by Trump and Rubio. This value is calculated by subtracting Trump’s 
percentage of the vote from Rubio’s percentage of the vote (Rubio’s percentage of the vote 
minus Trump’s percentage). 
Economic variables:  
Unemployment rate – the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ definition of unemployment includes 
people who do not “have a job, have actively looked for work in the prior four weeks, and are 
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currently available for work.” The unemployment rate “reflects the number of unemployed 
people as a percentage of the labor force.” This statistic is provided by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.  
Real income growth – this variable represents the net change of income from one period (year) to 
the next. This data is collected by the U.S. Census Bureau.  
Median household income – the median household income for each county is provided by the 
U.S. Census Bureau.  
Percentage of population in poverty – this variable represents the proportion of the population in 
a county that earns an amount of money below the poverty line. This data is collected by the U.S. 
Census Bureau.  
Cultural variables:  
Percentage of foreign-born population – this variable represents the proportion of population in 
a county that wasn’t born in the United States. This data is collected by the U.S. Census Bureau.  
Percentage of people that speaks a language other than English at home – this variable 
represents the proportion of population in a county whose primary language isn’t English. This 
data is collected by the U.S. Census Bureau.  
Population density – this variable represents the number of people living in a set area (i.e.: 
square mile). This data is collected by the U.S. Census Bureau.  
Demographic variables:  
Percentage of white voters in a county – this variables represents the proportion of voters whose 
race is white, and whose ethnicity is not Hispanic. This data is collected by the Division of 
Elections of the Florida Department of State. 
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Percentage of non-Cuban Hispanic residents in a county – this variables represents the 
proportion of residents whose ethnicity is Hispanic, and who are not of Cuban descent. This data 
is collected by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Percentage of Cuban residents in a county – this variable represents the proportion of residents 
whose ethnicity is Cuban, and who are descendants of Cuban immigrants or immigrants 
themselves. This data is collected by the U.S. Census Bureau.  
Percentage of African-American voters in a county – this variable represents the proportion of 
voters whose race is black. This data is collected by the Division of Elections of the Florida 
Department of State. 
Percentage of female residents in a county – this variable represents the proportion of residents 
in a county who are women. This data is collected by the U.S. Census Bureau.  
Percentage of residents aged 65 and older – this variable represents the proportion of residents 
in a county who are older than 65. This data is collected by the U.S. Census Bureau.  
Whites who did not finish high school – this variable represents the level of educational 
attainment, reported by the U.S. Census Bureau in terms of percentage of white residents in a 
county, aged 25 and older, who have not earned a high school diploma. 
Independents – this variable represents the number of voters who registered with no party 
affiliation or with a Minor Party. To obtain this value, the number of registered Democrats and 
Republicans will be subtracted from the value of registered voters in a county.  
Campaign variables:  
Campaign visits – a campaign visit is defined as public event such as a rally, in which either the 
presidential or vice presidential candidate participated. The effect of campaign visits tends to be 
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geographically contained, but nevertheless they can increase the amount of local media coverage. 
Therefore, a county receives two points for every visit; a county receives one point if a candidate 
visited its media market.    
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
Table 3: Explaining the 2016 Florida County Vote for President Trump: Bivariate Regressions 
Independent Variable B 
Standard 
Error 
Beta 
(R) 
R-
square 
Hypothesized 
Direction? 
Unemployment rate .458 1.901 .030 .001 Yes 
Income growth -1.446* .800 -.219 .048 Yes 
Median household income ($1000s) -.399** .197 -.243 .059 No 
Percentage of residents in poverty .575* .306 .227 .037 Yes 
Percentage of white voters .753*** .067 .814 .663 Yes 
Percentage of non-Cuban Hispanic 
residents 
-.647*** .152 -.468 .219 Yes 
Percentage of Cuban-American residents -1.111*** .345 -.371 .138 No 
Percentage of Black voters -.784*** .156 -.528 .279 Yes 
Percentage of female residents -1.993*** .377 -.548 .300 Yes 
Percentage of white residents 65 and 
older 
.488** .207 .280 .079 Yes 
Percentage of white residents with less 
than a high school diploma 
1.743*** .249 .656 .431 Yes 
Number of Trump campaign visits -2.215*** .644 -.392 .154 No 
Percentage of foreign-born residents -1.024*** .156 -.631 .398 Yes 
Percentage of residents who speak a 
language other than English at home 
-.632*** .107 -.591 .349 Yes 
Population density -.014 .003 -.551 .304 Yes 
Statistical Significance Level: * = .10     ** = .05     *** = .01 
Table 3 displays the results of 15 bivariate regressions with independent variables 
hypothesized to have an effect on the county level variance in the 2016 Florida presidential vote 
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for Donald Trump. Thirteen independent variables are statistically significant at .10 or better. Of 
these, ten variables are in the expected direction. Income growth, the percent of non-Cuban 
Hispanic residents, black voters, female residents, foreign-born residents, and residents who 
speak another language at home other than English, all have a negative association with the 
Trump vote as predicted.  Conversely poverty rate, the percent of white voters, white residents 
over age 65, and white residents with less than a high school education have a positive 
correlation as anticipated. Three statistically significant independent variables have a negative 
bivariate correlation with the Trump vote in a county even though hypothesized to have a 
positive effect: median household income, percentage of Cuban residents, and number of Trump 
campaign visits.  
The percent of white voters has the biggest single impact of all these variables explaining 
about 2/3 of the variance in the county-level vote for the president. A one percent increase in the 
percent of white voters correlates with a .75 percent increase in a county’s vote for Trump. The 
percent of white residents with less than a high school diploma explains 43 percent of the 
variance, and a one percent increase in lower educated whites leads to a 1.7 percent increase in 
the vote for Trump. Conversely, the percent of foreign-born residents in a county has the largest 
negative impact on the Trump vote, accounting for about 40 percent of the variance, with a one 
percent increase in foreign-born population associated with a one percent decrease in the Trump 
vote. Two variables were in the expected direction but did not achieve statistical significance in a 
bivariate relationship with the vote for Trump: county unemployment rate and population 
density. We now turn to multivariate regression in order to test relationships in a more 
comprehensive fashion. 
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Table 4: Explaining the 2016 Florida County Vote for President Trump: Full Model with Multi-Collinearity 
Problems 
Independent Variable B 
Standard 
Error 
Beta VIF 
Hypothesized 
Direction? 
Constant 34.783 39.050    
Unemployment rate 2.676** 1.029 .174 2.830 Yes 
Income growth -.651 .420 -.098 2.538 Yes 
Median household income .413** .177 .252 7.308 No 
Percentage of residents in poverty -.042 .291 -.016 8.299 No 
Percentage of white voters .204 .243 .221 43.416 Yes 
Percentage of non-Cuban Hispanic residents -.099 .402 -.072 52.972 Yes 
Percentage of Cuban-American residents .610 .388 .204 10.542 Yes 
Percentage of African-American voters -.510** .230 -.343 15.025 Yes 
Percentage of female residents -.372 .310 -.102 4.568 Yes 
Percentage of white residents 65 and older -.197 .127 -.113 3.344 No 
Percentage of white residents with less than 
a high school education 
1.265*** .253 .476 5.718 Yes 
Number of Trump visits -.072 .355 -.013 2.483 No 
Percentage of foreign-born residents -.287 .464 -.177 51.412 Yes 
Percentage of residents who speak a 
language other than English at home 
-.266 .648 -.248 230.649 Yes 
Population density -.002 .002 -.069 2.382 Yes 
Statistical Significance Level: * = .10     ** = .05     *** = .01 
R-Square = .919 Adj. R-Square = .895  F = 38.486***  DW = 2.051 
 Table 4 displays the results of the multiple regression analysis of all 15 independent 
variables hypothesized to affect the 2016 county level vote for Trump in Florida. Unfortunately, 
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this full model suffers from multi-collinearity and thus the results are not reliable and its 
explanatory value is questionable. There are only 67 cases (counties) but 15 independent 
variables.  The R-Square is quite high at .919 but only four independent variables are statistically 
significant. Nine of the 15 variables have a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) greater than five, 
with six of these variables greater than ten. Correlations greater than +/-.6 exist in the following 
sets of variables: 
• Non-Cuban Hispanic Residents with Foreign Born Residents (.74) and with 
“Other than English at Home” Residents (.90) suggesting these variables are 
tapping into a very similar underlying concept and that these groups are clustered 
in similar counties. 
• Cuban Residents with Foreign Born Residents (.80) and with “Other than English 
at Home” Residents (.73) intimating these variables are tapping into a very similar 
underlying concept and that these groups are clustered in similar counties. The 
correlation between Cuban and non-Cuban Hispanics is more modest (.41) and 
consistent with the observation that different Hispanic subgroups tend to spread 
out in different parts of Florida (Cubans in southern counties, Puerto Ricans in the 
central region, and Mexicans in the Panhandle). 
• Poverty with Median Household Income (-.85) and with Whites with Less than 
High School Education (.74) indicating the inverse relationship between high 
poverty and high income counties and the fact that counties with greater numbers 
of white residents with low education levels are likely to experience higher rates 
of poverty. 
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• White Residents with non-Cuban Hispanic (-.60), Black (-.68), Foreign Born (-
.67), and “Other than English at Home” Residents (-.72) demonstrating a strong 
negative relationship between “White” and these other variables and reflecting 
Florida’s actual settlement patterns where diverse population groups remain 
somewhat segregated and not spread evenly among its 67 counties.  
Based on this statistical information, previous research, and on the theories and 
hypotheses deemed most critical to exploring the variance in the 2016 Florida county vote for 
Trump, the “best” multivariate regression model excludes the following five independent 
variables: Median Household Income, Poverty, and White, Foreign Born, and “Other than 
English at Home” Residents. Two demographic variables of longstanding interest in Florida 
politics and considered crucial to past and future elections stay in the model: Cuban and non-
Hispanic Cuban residents. While the model excludes the overall percent of white residents, two 
other subgroups of white voters crucial to the Trump coalition remain: white seniors and whites 
without a high school diploma. Finally, while the model now excludes two economic variables, it 
still includes unemployment rate and income growth: both thought to be extremely important to 
voter decision-making. 
Table 5 displays the “best” multiple regression model containing ten independent 
variables that help to explain variance in the 2016 vote for President Trump in Florida counties. 
The model explains 89 percent of the variance, and seven out of ten variables are statistically 
significant. Unlike the full model, this one does not exhibit signs of multi-collinearity. The 
highest VIF for any variable is just 3.3 and the other nine VIF values are all less than 3.0. Out of 
90 possible correlations between the 10 independent variables, only one is greater than .6 
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(percent female has a -.69 correlation with the percent of whites with less than a high school 
education indicating that Florida counties with more women have smaller percentages of whites 
who failed to graduate from high school). 
Table 5: Explaining the 2016 Florida County Vote for President Trump: Best Model 
Independent Variable B 
Standard 
Error 
Beta VIF 
Hypothesized 
Direction? 
Constant 88.495*** 12.694    
Unemployment rate 1.896* 1.043 .124 2.363 Yes 
Income growth -.825** .347 -.125 1.404 Yes 
Percentage of non-Cuban Hispanic 
residents 
-.645*** .096 -.467 2.484 Yes 
Percentage of Cuban-American residents -.180 .156 -.060 1.379 No 
Percentage of African-American voters -.811*** .090 -.546 1.870 Yes 
Percentage of female residents -.504** .252 -.139 2.452 Yes 
Percentage of white residents 65 and 
older 
-.209 .128 -.120 2.776 No 
Percentage of white residents with less 
than a high school education 
.866*** .213 .326 3.295 Yes 
Number of Trump visits .167 .345 .030 1.905 Yes 
Population density -.004** .001 -.155 1.799 Yes 
Statistical Significance Level: * = .10     ** = .05     *** = .01 
R-Square = .890 Adj. R-Square = .871  F = 45.454***  DW = 1.925 
Seven independent variables attain statistical significance and all seven operate in the 
hypothesized direction. Counties with high unemployment rates and high percentages of white 
residents with less than a high school diploma were more likely to vote for Trump. Counties with 
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better income growth, more people per square mile, and higher percentages of non-Cuban 
Hispanics, blacks, and women gave Trump a lower share of the vote. According to the 
standardized regression coefficient (Beta) the African-American variable had the largest impact 
with each one percent increase in a county’s Black voters leading to a .81 decrease in the percent 
of vote for Trump. The percent of non-Cuban Hispanic population in a county had the second 
highest effect, with a one percent increase resulting in -.65 decrease in vote share for the 
president. Among variables with a positive statistically significant relationship, a one percent 
increase in white residents with less than a high school education correlated with a .87 percent 
increase in support for Trump (the third largest impact of all variables). 
Three variables did not achieve statistical significance. Counties with higher percentages 
of Cuban voters were no more or less likely to cast a ballot for Trump. Although exit polls 
indicate that the president won a majority of the Cuban vote at the individual level, the 
coefficient in this county-level model is negative. Similarly, the percent of white seniors in a 
county did not attain statistical significance. Again, the direction was opposite from expected as 
exit polls suggested that whites over the age of 65 were more likely to vote for Trump. Finally, 
the number of Trump visits to a county had a positive but statistically insignificant effect on 
voting for Trump. This does not mean these campaign rallies were ineffective, but only that their 
impact was no greater on the host counties than on any other county in the state in terms of vote 
margin. 
Switching gears from the presidential race to the senate race, Table 6 displays the results 
from a series of 15 bivariate regressions seeking to explain the variance in the 2016 Florida 
county level vote for Republican Senator Marco Rubio. 
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Table 6: Explaining the 2016 Florida County Vote for Senator Rubio: Bivariate Regressions 
Independent Variable B 
Standard 
Error 
Beta 
(R) 
R-
square 
Hypothesized 
Direction? 
Unemployment rate -.327 1.625 -.025 .001 No 
Income growth -1.127 .687 -.199 .040 Yes 
Median household income ($1000s) -.142 .173 -.101 .010 No 
Percentage of residents in poverty .262 .266 .121 .000 Yes 
Percentage of white voters .607*** .063 .768 .590 Yes 
Percentage of non-Cuban Hispanic 
residents 
-.476*** .134 -.403 .163 Yes 
Percentage of Cuban-American residents -.786** .302 -.308 .095 No 
Percentage of Black voters -.711*** .130 -.560 .314 Yes 
Percentage of female residents -1.484*** .339 -.478 .228 Yes 
Percentage of white residents 65 and 
older 
.386** .178 .259 .067 Yes 
Percentage of white residents with less 
than a high school diploma 
1.240*** .236 .546 .299 Yes 
Number of Trump campaign visits -1.637*** .563 -.339 .115 No 
Percentage of foreign-born residents -.754*** .144 -.544 .296 Yes 
Percentage of residents who speak a 
language other than English at home 
-.469*** .097 -.513 .263 Yes 
Population density -.011*** .002 -.504 .254 Yes 
Statistical Significance Level: * = .10     ** = .05     *** = .01 
 Eleven independent variables are statistically significant at .10 or better. Of these, nine 
variables are in the expected direction. Population density, the number of campaign visits by 
President Trump, and the percent of Cuban residents, non-Cuban Hispanic residents, black 
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voters, female residents, foreign-born residents, and residents who speak another language at 
home other than English, all have a negative association with the Rubio vote. Counties with large 
numbers people from groups that generally support the Democratic Party, including blacks, 
women, and non-Cuban Hispanics, all tended to give Rubio smaller shares of the vote. 
Two variables had an impact opposite of their hypothesized direction. Traditional 
campaign strategy suggests that the number of Trump visits to a county should increase votes for 
Rubio in those counties. This counterintuitive result may stem from the high number of Trump 
visits to large urban Democratic counties indicating an association between visits and 
Democratic vote share rather than campaign visits actually causing a decline in vote share. Of 
course, it is also possible that there was a backlash on candidates associated with Trump and the 
Republican Party due to Trump’s harsh rhetoric. In addition, Cuban population had a negative 
impact on the Rubio vote rather than a positive effect. At the individual level, exit polls indicate 
Cubans did support Rubio whose parents were both born in Cuba. However many Cuban 
residents live in counties that are more Democratic overall which may be the reason for the 
negative results at the county level. 
 Three variables associated with white Floridians had a statistically significant positive 
effect on the county level vote for Rubio. The overall percentage of white residents in a county 
had the strongest effect of any single variable tested, explaining nearly 60 percent of the variance 
in the county level Rubio vote. In addition, the percent of white seniors and less-educated whites 
also had a statistically significant positive effect on a county’s support for Rubio. 
 Interestingly, none of the economic variables achieved statistical significance in these 
bivariate regressions. County unemployment rate, income growth, median household income, 
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and poverty rate seemingly had no meaningful correlation with the Rubio vote. Unemployment 
rate and household income had coefficient signs opposite of expectations. 
 An examination of a full model (not displayed here) explaining the Rubio county level 
vote including all 15 independent variables resulted in the same multi-collinearity problems 
found in the Trump full model regression. The same nine variables that had high VIF scores in 
the Trump model had high VIF scores in the Rubio model and the same sets of variables again 
displayed high levels of correlation with each other. This result is not surprising given the exact 
same independent variables were entered into the full Rubio model with only the dependent 
variable different. The same solution applies to both models. The best model explaining the 
county level Rubio vote excludes the same five variables as before: Median Household Income, 
Poverty, and White, Foreign Born, and “Other than English at Home” Residents.  The remaining 
ten independent variables comprise the multivariate model displayed in Table 7. 
Table 7: Explaining the 2016 Florida County Vote for Senator Rubio: Best Model 
Independent Variable B 
Standard 
Error 
Beta VIF 
Hypothesized 
Direction? 
Constant 86.362*** 15.993    
Unemployment rate 1.131 1.315 .086 2.363 Yes 
Income growth -.588 .437 -.104 1.404 Yes 
Percentage of non-Cuban Hispanic 
residents 
-.483*** .122 -.409 2.484 Yes 
Percentage of Cuban-American residents -.098 .196 -.038 1.379 No 
Percentage of African-American voters -.761*** .113 -.600 1.870 Yes 
Percentage of female residents -.344 .317 -.111 2.452 Yes 
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Percentage of white residents 65 and 
older 
-.234 .162 -.157 2.776 No 
Percentage of white residents with less 
than a high school education 
.536* .269 .236 3.295 Yes 
Number of Trump visits .100 .434 .021 1.905 Yes 
Population density -.004** .002 -.191 1.799 Yes 
Statistical Significance Level: * = .10     ** = .05     *** = .01 
R-Square = .761 Adj. R-Square = .719  F = 17.879***  DW = 2.086 
 The multivariate model explains 76 percent of the variance in the 2016 Florida county 
vote for Senator Rubio. Only one variable has a VIF slightly over 3 and the VIF scores for the 
other nine independent variables are less than 3.0 indicating that multi-collinearity is not a an 
issue. Four variables achieve statistical significance and all four are in the expected direction. A 
higher percentage of non-Cuban Hispanics and black voters in a county, and more people per 
square mile, associates with a lower vote total for Senator Rubio. The African-American variable 
has the strongest impact (Beta = -.60) and the non-Cuban Hispanic variable has the second 
largest (Beta = -.41). Conversely, a one percent increase in white residents without a college 
degree in a county correlates with a .54 increase in votes cast for Senator Rubio. Neither 
unemployment rate nor economic growth attain statistical significance although both have the 
predicted direction. The percent of female residents and the number of Trump visits to a county 
had no statistically significant relationship with the county vote for Rubio although both 
variables were in the expected direction. Finally, the percent of Cuban residents and older white 
Floridians also did not achieve statistical significance, and neither of these coefficients operated 
in the hypothesized direction (both were negative). 
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 Table 8 compares the regression results for the best multivariate models for President 
Trump and Senator Rubio. Four of the variables affected both Trump and Rubio’s respective 
levels of support similarly (same direction, and showing statistical significance): percentage of 
non-Cuban Hispanic residents, percentage of African-American voters, percentage of white 
residents with less than a high school diploma, and population density. While the percentage of 
non-Cuban residents had a negative effect on the level of support for both Republican 
candidates, the effect was more pronounced in Trump’s case, with a B value of -.645 for Trump 
and -.483 for Rubio. In addition, while the percentage of white residents with less than a high 
school education had a positive effect on the level of support for both candidates, this positive 
relationship was stronger with Trump’s level of support (B value of .866 for Trump compared to 
a B value of .536 for Rubio).  
 Three variables were not statistically significant in both models, but had the same 
direction: the percentage of Cuban-American residents, the percentage of white residents aged 65 
and older, and the number of Trump visits. Finally, three variables showed statistical significance 
in one model but not the other. Two economic variables – unemployment rate and income 
growth – were statistically significant in Trump’s model but not in Rubio’s (the direction of the 
relationship was the same in both models). A possible explanation might be that economic 
matters might be more salient in national races than in congressional races, given that members 
of Congress have the opportunity to work toward re-election through means like casework in an 
attempt to build closer relationships with constituents, even in statewide offices like Senator. 
Finally, the percentage of female residents was statistically significant in Trump’s model but not 
in Rubio’s. 
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Table 8: Comparing Multi-variate Regression Results: The 2016 Florida County Vote for Trump and Rubio 
Independent Variable Trump Model B Values Rubio Model B Values 
Constant 88.495*** 86.362*** 
Unemployment rate 1.896* 1.131 
Income growth -.825** -.588 
Percentage of non-Cuban Hispanic 
residents 
-.645*** -.483*** 
Percentage of Cuban-American 
residents 
-.180 -.098 
Percentage of African-American 
voters 
-.811*** -.761*** 
Percentage of female residents -.504** -.344 
Percentage of white residents 65 
and older 
-.209 -.234 
Percentage of white residents with 
less than a high school education 
.866*** .536* 
Number of Trump visits .167 .100 
Population density -.004** -.004** 
R-Square .890 .761 
Statistical Significance Level: * = .10     ** = .05     *** = .01 
Table 9 shows the bivariate regression results for the model that seeks to explain the 
difference between the Rubio and Trump vote. As a reminder, the dependent variable is the 
Rubio percent in each county minus the Trump percent in each county. Thus, there is a positive 
number for counties where Rubio gained more votes than Trump and a negative number when 
Trump outperformed Rubio.  
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Six of the eight variables are statistically significant at .10 or better. Of these, five 
variables show the expected direction. The percentage of non-Cuban Hispanic, Cuban-American 
and female residents, and the percentage of voters registered with no party affiliation or a minor 
party, have a positive effect on the difference in support between Trump and Rubio, as we 
hypothesized. Conversely, the percentage of white residents with less than a high school diploma 
and the percentage of residents who make $50,000 or less had a negative relationship with the 
difference in support for the candidates. Counties with a high percentage of households earning 
less than $50,000 were more likely to vote for Trump than Rubio, contrary to our hypothesis. 
Neither of the economic variables achieved statistical significance.   
The percentage of white voters with less than a high school diploma has the biggest effect 
among all of the variables included in the model, as it explains about 45% of the variance in the 
Florida county vote difference between President Trump and Senator Rubio. For every one-point 
increase of these residents in a county, Trump would do better than Rubio by .503%. The 
percentage of voters registered with no party affiliation or with a minor party has the largest 
positive impact on the difference in support between Trump and Rubio, explaining about 31% of 
the variance. For every one-point increase in the registration of these types of voters, Rubio 
would outperform Trump by .314%. 
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Table 9: Explaining the 2016 Florida County Vote Difference between President Trump and Senator Rubio: 
Bivariate Regressions 
 (Dependent Variable = Rubio percent – Trump percent) 
Independent Variable B 
Standard 
Error 
Beta 
(R) 
R-
square 
Hypothesized 
Direction? 
Unemployment Rate -.785 .527 -.182 .033 Yes 
Income Growth .319 .228 .171 .029 Yes 
Percentage of non-Cuban Hispanic 
residents 
.170*** .043 .437 .191 Yes 
Percentage of Cuban-American residents .324*** .097 .384 .148 Yes 
Percentage of Female Residents .509*** .110 .497 .247 Yes 
Percentage of white residents with less 
than a high school diploma 
-.503*** .069 -.672 .452 Yes 
Percentage of households with income 
less than $50,000 a year 
-.265*** .046 -.580 .336 No 
Percentage of voters registering with no 
party affiliation or minor party 
.314*** .058 .559 .312 Yes 
Statistical Significance Level: * = .10     ** = .05     *** = .01 
Table 10 displays the multivariate regression results for the model explaining the 
difference in the Florida 2016 county level vote between Senator Rubio and President Trump. As 
a reminder, the dependent variable is the Rubio percent in each county minus the Trump percent 
in each county. Thus, there is a positive number for counties where Rubio gained more votes 
than Trump and a negative number when Trump outperformed Rubio. The model displays little 
evidence of multi-collinearity as all VIFs but one are less than 5.0. The only variable above, 
whites with less than a high school education, has a VIF of just 5.3 and its high correlation (.78) 
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with household incomes under $50,000 does not seem to have an adverse statistical effect on the 
results. The variables in the model explain 69.9% of the variation in the difference in support 
between Trump and Rubio.  
Seven of the eight variables achieved statistical significance: income growth, the 
percentage of non-Cuban Hispanic, Cuban, and female residents, the percentage of whites with 
less than a high school education, the percentage of households with less than $50,000 in 
income, and the percentage of voters registered with no party affiliation or a minor party. 
Unemployment did not attain statistical significance but did have a negative sign as expected. 
The model showed a positive relationship between the difference in support for Trump 
and Rubio and the percentage of non-Cuban Hispanic residents and this variable had the most 
impact (the highest unstandardized regression coefficient .591). The fact that Rubio performed 
better than Trump among members of this voting bloc is not surprising given Trump’s comments 
concerning Hispanic illegal immigrants. Rubio also did better in counties with higher 
percentages of female residents indicating that Trump’s crude comments about women also hurt 
him among these voters. As predicted, given Rubio’s Cuban ethnicity, Rubio also did better in 
counties with higher percentages of Cuban voters. 
The model showed a negative relationship between the difference in support for Trump 
and Rubio and the percentage of whites with a high school education or less, households making 
less than $50,000 and voters not registered with a major party. Trump’s rhetoric aimed at 
mobilizing working class whites helped him with Florida voters at the county level. Trump also 
did better in counties with higher percentages of households making less than $50,000. This 
result, opposite the hypothesized direction based on exit polls, suggests that again Trump’s 
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specific appeal to lower income voters worked better than Rubio’s traditional campaign. 
Although it is possible that the county level unit of analysis simply presents a different result 
than would be found at the individual level of analysis (an ecological fallacy). 
In addition, the model showed a negative relationship between the difference in support 
for Trump and Rubio and the percentage of voters who registered with no party affiliation or 
with a minor party. This was contrary to our hypothesis and opposite the findings of the exit 
polls where Rubio did slightly better than Trump among self-identified independents. One 
possible explanation is that self-identification as independent in an exit poll does not correspond 
exactly with registration with no party or a minor party. It could also be that Trump’s unorthodox 
campaign, unusual stance on some issues, and position as an “outsider” candidate attracted more 
independents then Rubio’s more conventional Republican conservative candidacy. 
Table 10: Explaining the 2016 Florida County Vote Difference between President Trump and Senator Rubio: 
Multivariate Regression 
(Dependent Variable = Rubio percent – Trump percent) 
Independent Variable B 
Standard 
Error 
Beta VIF 
Hypothesized 
Direction? 
Constant -1.496 5.921    
Unemployment Rate -.671 .423 -.155 1.841 Yes 
Income Growth .415*** .148 .223 1.221 Yes 
Percentage of non-Cuban Hispanic 
residents 
.230*** .041 .591 2.160 Yes 
Percentage of Cuban-American residents .118* .069 .141 1.282 Yes 
Percentage of Female Residents .355*** .129 .346 3.059 Yes 
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Percentage of white residents with less 
than a high school diploma 
-.253** .124 -.338 5.308 Yes 
Percentage of households with income 
less than $50,000 a year 
-.134** .060 -.294 3.344 No 
Percentage of voters registering with no 
party affiliation or minor party 
-.252 .084 -.448 4.298 Yes 
Statistical Significance Level: * = .10     ** = .05     *** = .01 
R-Square = .699 Adj. R-Square =.657  F = 16.804***  DW = 2.172 
In addition to the multivariate model shown, another version was estimated that included 
a dummy variable for Miami Dade County in order to see if Rubio’s home county had an 
independent effect on the results (Rubio outpolled Trump heavily in Miami Dade). However 
adding the Miami Dade dummy variable resulted in multi-collinearity. The Miami Dade dummy 
variable was not statistically significant (.612), had a high VIF (7.1) and was highly correlated 
(.90) with Cuban population percent. It also increased the VIF of the Cuban variable to 
unacceptably high levels (8.2), and increased the probability value so that Cuban population was 
no longer statistically significant (.835). The Miami Dade variable does achieve statistical 
significance in a model where it replaced the Cuban population variable. All of this evidence 
suggests that the effect of Miami Dade on the election results largely occurred because of the 
large Cuban population that resides there rather than a simple “hometown” advantage for Rubio 
(although impossible to know for sure given the small sample size of 67 counties). Thus, 
multivariate model excludes the Miami Dade dummy variable and retains the Cuban percent of 
population.  
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CONCLUSION 
Before this thesis, my expectations were that we would find remarkable differences in the 
structure of support for these two Republican candidates – after all, during the Republican 
presidential primaries Trump and Rubio showed not only a different style of campaigning but 
also different visions of the best road ahead for the country. While Rubio often talked about how 
his parents were immigrants and had to work incredibly hard for their family to thrive, Trump 
used harsh rhetoric against undocumented immigrants. While Trump promised to bring back jobs 
to America, Rubio seemed to accept that the structure of the economy was changing and focused 
on education as a way to enable people to still be able to succeed in the world of globalization 
and automation. However, the results of this thesis suggest more similarities between Trump and 
Rubio than we could have predicted.    
First, bivariate regression was used to examine the relationship between the level of 
support for Trump and Rubio respectively and the variables that were detailed in the 
methodology section. The bivariate regression models for both candidates were quite similar. In 
most cases, the direction of the relationships was as hypothesized, with the exception of 
unemployment rate in the Rubio model, which was not statistically significant. In some 
instances, the effect of some variables was stronger on Trump’s model, notably the percent of 
white residents with less than a high school education or the percent of white residents aged 65 
and older. Conversely, some of the variables that had a negative effect on the levels of support of 
both candidates didn’t have as negative an effect on Rubio’s model – for example, a one-point 
increase in the percentage of non-Cuban residents in a county would lead to a decrease of 
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Trump’s level of support by 0.647% compared to a decrease in support for Rubio of 0.476%. 
Even then, that difference is not as large as we could have expected.  
Both multivariate regression models were affected by multicollinearity. In order to reduce 
error that might stem from this problem, five independent variables were dropped from Trump’s 
multivariate regression model. Of the remaining 10 independent variables, 7 showed statistical 
significance and the direction of their relationship with the dependent variable was as 
hypothesized. The same solution was applied to Rubio’s multivariate regression model. Four 
variables showed statistical significance and in the expected direction. It is interesting to note 
that the variables in the best model for Trump accounted for 89% of the variance in his level of 
support, while the same variables accounted for 76.1% of the variance in the level of support for 
Rubio.  
Next, we examined the actual difference in support between Trump and Rubio 
(understood as Rubio support minus Trump support). In the case of the multivariate regression, 
seven variables showed statistical significance: income growth, the percentage of non-Cuban 
Hispanic, Cuban, and female residents, the percentage of whites with less than a high school 
education, the percentage of households with less than $50,000 in income, and the percentage of 
voters registered with no party affiliation or a minor party. 
Rubio did better than Trump in counties with larger percentages of non-Cuban, Cuban 
and female residents. Trump outpolled Rubio in counties with higher percentages of whites 
without a high school diploma, households making less than $50,000, and voters registered with 
no major party affiliation. Trump won Florida and won the presidency but did not enlarge the 
Republican base in terms of ethnicity or gender. The harsh rhetoric Trump used to describe 
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illegal immigrants from Latin Americans hurt him with Hispanic voters. Trump’s crass 
description of women did nothing to shrink the gender gap that often appears in partisan 
elections.  
Trump was able to win by enlarging his share of the white vote, particularly working 
class white. It remains to be seen if other Republican candidates could adopt a strategy like 
Trump’s and be successful. In addition, other factors such as Democratic fatigue after President 
Obama’s 8 years in the White House along with other elements outside of the control of both 
campaigns could have led to Trump’s victory in Florida and in other key states.  
The idea that populism could be a successful strategy for Republicans to broaden their 
metaphorical tent could lead to more and more Republican candidates embracing Trump’s 
agenda. Every Republican candidate in the 2018 mid-terms – in Florida and across the country – 
has a choice to make regarding the President, a choice that will undoubtedly be made with the 
goal of re-election in mind. Based on the success or failure of their strategies, the face of the 
Republican Party may change forever, or we might see a return to normalcy following the 2018 
elections. Democrats, too, have a choice. If enough people feel like President Trump speaks for 
them, relentless attacks might make some voters feel like they’re the ones who are being 
denigrated by the Democratic Party.  
Another possibility is that Trump was able to win in spite of his campaign tactics. This 
could mean that political operatives overestimate the effect of campaigns on election outcomes 
and forces outside of their control are more likely to affect who wins. On this note, we weren’t 
able to examine many of the campaign variables that might affect the level of support for Trump 
and Rubio. Further research could compare the advertising patterns of the Trump campaign with 
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those of previous Republican presidential candidates in Florida, a state that has been similarly 
competitive for several election cycles now. Advertising data from the 2016 election will become 
available following the mid-term elections this fall through the Wesleyan Media Project. Given 
the other limitation of the study – studying individual behavior at the county level – future 
research might use regression analysis to explore individual level exit poll results, which are not 
yet available. 
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